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Iatse 856 Collective Agreement

FN 8. The respondents` appeal in the argument that an indeterminate employment contract may be terminated as it sees fit, unless the consideration, other than contract services (Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 713, 727 for 12), has no place. First, to the extent that the complaint is based on the collective agreement that would have come into force from February 1, 1969 to January 31, 1973, the complaint is not permanent with respect to its duration. Second, the above principle is merely a construction rule, subject to the introduction of further evidence of the parties` intent. (Drzewiecki v. H-R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App.3d 695, 702-704 [101 Cal. Rptr. 169]; agreement, ruinello v.

Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 690 [227 p.2d 251]; Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union, supra, see 727.) Third, the contractual clause at issue, since it was negotiated by the union in collective bargaining, may contain consideration other than the services to be provided by the employee. (See Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 cal. 2d 169, 189-190 [14 Cal. Rptr.

297, 363 p.2d 313].) With respect to the third and fourth grounds, the grievance properly asserts a breach of the collective agreement in order to indicate a means of invoking a plea and to justify the Tribunal`s jurisdiction. The applicant may not be able to maintain his interpretation of the contract in court. But he never had an opportunity to provide extrinsic evidence that his interpretation was what the parties intended to do when they entered into the agreement. We believe that the language of paragraph 56 is sufficiently ambiguous when read in light of the applicant`s assertions about the purpose of the provision that extrinsic evidence of its importance would be admissible. (Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 315 [38 Cal. Rptr.

505, 392 P.2d 265]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, 402, 2059-2061; see Pacific Gas – E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37-40 [69 Cal. 561, 442 p.2d 641, 40 A.L.R.3d 1373].) Mgm argues that “the fundamental conduct for which the applicant seeks discharge” is that of the union when negotiating with MGM to interpret the provision and that the allegations of breach are merely a “convenient characterization”. We do not agree.

If, as MGM requested, we look at the merits of the case and not the labels, the substance of the complainant`s complaint is that he was discharged by MGM in violation of section 56 of the collective agreement. If the union were still obliged to be the bereavement advocate, few complaints could be resolved by covering up. The Supreme Court said in Vaca v. Sipes, supra, 386 U.S. at pages 191-192 [17 L.Ed.2d, pages 858-859]: “… When making available a claim and arbitration procedure that gives the union the power to supervise the appeal machine and to avail itself of arbitration, the employer and the union believe that each will try in good faith to settle claims without arbitration. This comparison process puts an end to complaints lightly before the most costly and time-consuming step in appeals proceedings. In addition, both parties are confident that similar complaints are dealt with consistently and major problems with the interpretation of the collective agreement can be isolated and perhaps resolved. Finally, the comparison process promotes the union`s interest as a legal agent and as a co-re-edator of the collective agreement to represent workers in the application of this agreement. … [¶] If the individual worker could force the reconciliation of his complaint on its merits, the contract resolution machine would be significantly compromised, destroying the employer`s confidence in the union`s authority and bringing the grieving individual back to the whims of independent and non-systemic negotiations.